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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission which found that the
Claimant was not entitled to disability benefits over and above the 2% whole person impairment
rating she was provided as a result of a 2006 industrial accident.
The Claimant seeks review of the Industrial Commission determination that the Claimant
did not suffer any disability in excess of her 2% whole person impairment rating, arguing that
there is no substantial and competent evidence to sustain the factual finding by the Industrial
Commission.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDING

The Claimant was injured on October 31, 2006 while employed by SVL Analytical Inc.
She tripped over a dog at work falling to the floor.

Prior to the industrial accident the

Claimant had undergone a discectomy and fusion of her cervical spine at C5-6 to correct a
degenerative disc condition. The initial surgery was performed by Dr. Jeffrey Larson on May
15, 2006. X-rays taken subsequent to the initial surgery showed a successful fusion progressing.
Two weeks after the industrial accident, the Claimant again saw Dr. Larson. Based on
results of a second x-ray exam, Dr. Larson determined there was a pseudoathrosis or non-union
of the fusion at C5-6. Dr. Larson attributed the pseudoathrosis to the fall at work. (Larson
Deposition, p. 14). Dr. Larson performed a supplemental fusion on January 19, 2007 at the same
C5-6 level. (Larson Deposition, pp. 10, 11 ).
The claim was accepted by the Surety and medical and time loss benefits were paid to
· the Claimant. The Claimant filed a Complaint against both the Employer (SVL Analytical) and
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Surety (State Insurance Fund). The State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, hereinafter
referred to as the ISIF, was also joined by the Claimant. In her complaint against the ISIF, the
Claimant asserted that she was totally and permanently disabled based on her pre-existing
lumbar, cervical and knee condition and the effects of the October 31, 2006 industrial accident.
(R. p. 36).
A hearing was conducted on February 15, 2012, by an Industrial Commission Referee
who subsequently issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Recommendation. The
Referee found that the Claimant suffered permanent disability from all causes of 45% inclusive
of permanent partial impairment but apportioned all but 2% to pre-existing conditions. (R. p.
55). In essence, the Referee found no disability in excess of the 2% impairment attributable to
the 2006 industrial accident. The Referee also found that the Claimant was not 100% totally and
permanently disabled, nor an odd-lot worker. (R. p. 55).
The Industrial Commission did not adopt the Referee's recommendation and issued its
own Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. p. 56). The Commission found that the
Claimant had failed to establish that she has suffered any disability as a result of the subject
accident over and above her 2% PPI rating. The Commission relied upon the testimony of Dr.
Larson (the treating surgeon) and Dr. Stevens (who performed an Independent Medical Exam)
that the 2006 accident did not result in any additional restrictions or limitations.

The

Commission also determined that Claimant had failed to establish that she was totally and
permanently disabled.
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We find Claimant's testimony that she experienced a permanent worsening of her
condition following the October 31, 2006 accident to be unpersuasive. More
persuasive to the Commission is the testimony of Dr. Larson, as supported by his
records and objective medical testing. Claimant suffered from non-work related
disease of the cervical spine which led to spinal fusion surgery on May 15, 2006.
Claimant may or may not have reached a point of medical stability from this
surgery by the time the accident of October 31, 2006 occurred. Regardless,
although Claimant has successfully demonstrated that the October 31, 2006
accident did cause a fracture of the C5-6 fusion mass, there is no evidence that
that accident caused additional injury at levels above or below CS-6. Claimant
received appropriate medical care for the CS-6 fracture and follow-up medical
records demonstrate a solid fusion at CS-6. Although Claimant has gone on to
require additional surgery at C4-5, the parties are in agreement that the subject
accident did not contribute to the need for that surgery. Claimant's treating
physician has cogently testified that with the successful fusion revision, Claimant
has returned to base line without any additional limitations that can fairly be
referred to that accident. We find this testimony persuasive.
Findings, Conclusion and Order, p. 26 (R. pg. 81).
The Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration. (R. p. 86). The Commission denied the
Motion for Reconsideration, again holding that Dr. Larson's testimony was entitled to greater
weight than that of the Claimant on the issue of whether the Claimant had any new limitations or
restrictions as a result of the industrial accident and the supplemental fusion. The Commission
made the factual finding, based upon Dr. Larson's medical records and his post hearing
deposition testimony, that the industrial accident did nothing to increase Claimant's permanent
limitations or restrictions. Finally, the Commission also found that the Claimant did not meet
her burden of proof concerning her establishing permanent disability either under the 100%
method or by use of the Odd-Lot Doctrine. (R. p. 89).

III.
1.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

Is the Respondent ISIF entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.A.R. 11.2?
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IV.
1.

ARGUMENT

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEWS QUESTIONS OF FACT ONLY TO
DETERL'VIINE
WHETHER
SUBSTANTIAL
AND
COMPETENT
EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS.

When the Supreme Court reviews a decision of the Industrial Commission, it exercises
free review over questions of law, but reviews questions of fact only to determine whether
substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings. Gooby v. Lake Shore

·Mgmt. Co., 136 Idaho 79, 29 P.3d 390 (2001). Substantial and competent evidence is relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Id. Because the
Commission is the fact finder, its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the evidence will
not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Id The Collli does not weigh the
evidence or consider whether it would have reached a different conclusion from the evidence
presented. Id. Whether a claimant has an impairment and the degree of permanent disability
resulting from an industrial injury are questions of fact. Id.
A claimant has permanent disability "when the actual or presumed ability to engage in
gainful activity is reduced or absent because of permanent impairment and no fundamental or
marked change in the future can reasonably be expected." LC. § 72-423. A permanent disability
rating is the appraisal of the claimant's "present and probable future ability to engage in gainful
activity as it is affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment and by pertinent
nonmedical factors as provided in [LC. § 72-430]." LC. § 72-425. "The central focus of [LC. §
72-425] is on the ability to engage in gainful activity."' Smith v. Payette County, 105 Idaho 618,
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621, 671 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1983) (quoting Baldner v. Bennett's Inc., 103 Idaho 458, 462, 649
P.2d 1214, 1218 (1982)).

The degree of a permanent disability and the cause(s) of disability are factual questions
committed to the particular expertise of the commission. Thom v. Callahan, 97 Idaho 151, 540
P.2d 1330 (1975).

2.

BOTH DR. STEVENS AND THE TREATING SURGEON DR. LARSON
WERE OF THE OPINION THAT THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT DID
NOT RESULT IN ANY ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL RESTRICTIONS OR
LIMITATIONS.

In this case there are two medical doctors who have provided opinions concerning the
effects of the Claimant's October 2006 industrial accident; the treating surgeon, Dr. Larson who
perfonned the initial non-industrial fusion surgery at C5-6 and the redo fusion surgery
necessitated by the industrial accident, and Dr. Stevens who performed an Independent Medical
Exam at the request of the Surety.
Dr. Larson in a letter to the State Insurance Fund stated:
"Ms. Sevy does not have any work restrictions related to her neck condition.
She has a history of having an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at C5-6
on 5/15/2006. She then fell at work and had developed pseudoarthrosis at that
level, and had surgery for pseudoarthrosis on January 19, 2007. Any restrictions
that she may have, and I don't think there are any related to her neck, would
relate to the to [sic] previous condition for which she had surgery done on May
15, 2006. The second surgery was a supplemental fusion at that same level and
would not add any restrictions." [emphasis added]
Exhibit 1, p. 9.
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The Claimant underwent an independent medical evaluation by J. Craig Stevens, M.D., in
October 2007, almost one year after the dog incident. Dr. Stevens agreed that the Claimant
sustained a failure of her cervical fusion on the date of injury, October 31, 2006. (Exhibit 2, p.
108). He found that the Claimant was at maximum medical improvement and medically stable
as of October 3, 2007. (Exhibit 2, p. 108). With regard to physical restrictions related to the
October 31, 2006, fall and subsequent supplemental fusion, Dr. Stevens stated as follows:
PHYSICAL RESTRJCTIONS: The incident of October 31, 2006, and subsequent
surgery of January 19, 2007, will not result in permanent work restrictions. While
her most recent FCE did result in the identification of a 45 lb. lift "limitation";
those restrictions based on that would relate in their entirety to her lumbar and
thoracic condition and not to her cervical condition. No restrictions are indicated
pertinent to her cervical condition.
(Exhibit 2, p. 109).
Dr. Stevens apportioned 2% percent of a 12% whole person impairment to the industrial
accident (Exhibit 2, p. 110)1. In a written response to the Idaho Industrial Commission dated
September 25, 2007, Dr. Stevens indicated that the Claimant could return to her employment
based upon the job site evaluation of extraction lab technician. He again noted no restrictions
pertinent to her cervical neck condition or the effects of the October 31, 2006 incident. (Exhibit
2, p. 111).

1 The additional 2% impairment is based on Table 15-7, p. 404 of the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment. Fifth Edition. A second cervical fusion entitles the worker to a 2% upward adjustment.
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3.

THE FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY EVALUATION DOES NOT ADDRESS
WHICH RESTRICTIONS RELATE TO THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
OR THE INITIAL FUSION SURGERY.

A functional capacity evaluation was performed by Mark Bengston of Pinnacle Physical
Therapy and Sports Medicine. (Exhibit 10).

The Claimant demonstrated, as part of the

functional capacity evaluation, the ability to lift on an occasional basis up to forty-five pounds,
and the ability to stand and walk up to eight consecutive hours. The FCE did not find a match
between her abilities and the physical requirements of the Claimant's job at SVL Analytical. The
report did find that the Claimant could perform sedentary and light duty work pursuant to the
U.S. Department of Labor Physical Demand Level.

The projection was for full time

employment of eight hours a day, five days per week. (Exhibit 10, p. 322).
On the issue of whether the October 31, 2006, accident resulted m any additional
restrictions or limitations, the functional capacity evaluation performed by Mark Bengston is not
helpful. It is beyond Mr. Bengston' s area of expertise to render opinions as to medical causation
and/or apportionment. The purpose and scope of the FCE was limited to measuring the
Claimant's ability to do a set of physical functions over a one day testing period. At no time
during Mr. Bengston's deposition did he venture any opinion on the effects of the industrial
accident, as opposed to the pre-existing cervical fusion as it related to the results of the FCE. In
fact, Claimant's counsel never inquired of Mr. Bengston as to his opinion on which restrictions
might relate to the first fusion or the industrial accident.
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the Commission noted in its findings:
Importantly, however, Mr. Bengston did not provide any testimony on the
question of whether or not, or to what extent, Claimant's cervical spine
limitations/restrictions are referable to the subject accident versus Claimant's
documented history of pre-existing cervical spine injury. In short, his testimony
does not support a finding that Claimant has limitations/restrictions that are
referable to the subject accident of October 31, 2006.
Findings, Conclusions and Order (R. p. 80).
In the final analysis the only support in the record for a finding that Claimant's
functional abilities were permanently impacted by the accident of October 31,
2006 is found in the testimony of Claimant herself.
Findings, Conclusions and Order, (R. p. 80).

4.

AN IMPAIRMENT RATING DOES NOT ENTITLE A CLAIMANT TO A
DISABILITY RATING.

Essential to the Claimant's argument in her brief, is that since the Commission found the
Claimant had a 2% whole person impairment rating based upon Dr. Stevens' Independent
Medical Evaluation, that the Claimant is therefore entitled to a disability over and above
impairment. Nowhere in the Idaho Code, nor in the decisions of the Industrial Commission, nor
the Supreme Court is there a basis for that argument. It is the Claimant who bears the burden of
proof in establishing disability in excess of impairment. McCabe v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 145
Idaho 91 (2007); Bennett v. Clark Hereford Ranch, 106 Idaho 438 (1984).
The AMA Guides to Evaluation of Impairment, Fifth Edition recognize "[a]n impaired
th

individual may or may not have a disability." AMA Guides, 5 Ed., p. 3. In addition the Guides
recognize that the whole person impairment rating is an estimate of the impact on the
individual's overall ability to perform activities of daily living, but specifically excludes work
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activity from impairment calculations. AMA Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment,
Fifth Edition, p. 4.
In the present case, the Claimant has failed to demonstrate that she suffers any disability
as a direct result of the 2006 industrial accident and supplemental fusion. Moreover, a permanent
impairment rating is not to be used as a direct determinate of work disability. The AMA Guides,
5th Ed. state the following:
As a result, impairment ratings are not intended for use as direct determinants of
work disability. \Vhen a physician is asked to evaluate work-related disability, it is
appropriate for a physician knowledgeable about the work activities of the patient to
discuss the specific activities the worker can and cannot do, given the permanent
impairment.
AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Fifth Edition Philosophy, Purpose, and
Appropriate Use of the Guides, p. 5.

5.

THE CLAIMANT IS NOT TOTALLY AND PERi'1ANENTLY DISABLED
AND THE ISIF HAS NO LIABILITY.

There are four requirements that must be met in order for a Claimant to establish ISIF
liability under Idaho Code §72-332(1):
There must be a pre-existing impairment; and
• the impairment must be manifest; and
• the impairment must constitute a subjective hindrance to employment; and
• the impairment must combine with the subsequent injury to cause total disability.
A party seeking to establish liability against the ISIF pursuant to Idaho Code §72-332

carries the burden of proof. Boley v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 130 Idaho 278
(1997). For the ISIF to be liable, the combined effects of both the pre-existing impairment and
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the subsequent injury or occupational disease must render the employee totally and permanently
disabled. Bybee v. State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 76 (1996).
The Claimant's brief spends time re-arguing the issue of total and permanent disability
pursuant to the Odd-Lot Doctrine, and takes issue with many of the findings of the Commission.
In summary, the Commission found that the Claimant could perform sedentary and light work,
which comprise approximately two-thirds of the jobs in the national labor market. The
Claimant's own expert, Mr. Bengston testified in his post-hearing deposition on the Claimant's
ability to perform sedentary and light work on a full time basis based upon the results of his
FCE:
That's the actual performance that she provided during the FCE. The category
that she fit into, according to the U.S. Department of Labor standards, is the light
category based upon her physical abilities and keeping in mind the limitations that
I observed. She did demonstrate some ability slightly above the light physical
demand category. Collectively the whole test when summarized did not support
her falling into a medium level physical demand category. However she did
satisfy all of the requirements of light physical demand level work.
Mark Bengston Post-Hearing Deposition, pp. 37-38.
The evidence before the Commission is that the Claimant can perform sedentary and light
work on a forty hour per week full time basis, even if she is limited to overhead work on a rare
basis.
In addition, the Claimant provided childcare for her three grandchildren, including a
newborn, on a full time basis for approximately ten months, which demonstrates that the
Claimant retains significant physical abilities. The Claimant worked 40 hours per week for the
Idaho Child Care Program for 10 months. (Hrg. Tr. p. 178).
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In addition, the Claimant did not perform any job search from 2007, when she left SVL
Analytical, until late 2011, shortly before the hearing. (Hrg. Tr. p. 177). The only work search
Claimant did was perfunctory and done shortly before hearing.
Finally, the Claimant continues to misinterpret the results of the Skill TR.Ai~ analysis and
the testimony of Dr. Nancy Collins. The Claimant asserts in her Brief that Dr. Collins testified
that due to Claimant's restrictions, she would lose access to 90% of her time of injury labor
market, Dr. Collins testified to nothing of the sort. In fact, Dr. Collins testified extensively that
the Claimant's expert, Dan Brownell, skewered the SkillTRAN results by adjusting for reaching
in all directions.

The SkillTRAN computer program cannot differentiate between reaching

straight ahead with overhead reaching. As Dr. Collins testified, if you adjust for all reaching,
you lose over 90% of the jobs in the labor market since most jobs involve some use of the hands.
(Dr. Nancy Collins' Deposition, pp. 49-50).
Of course, the Claimant does not have a restriction against all reaching, but is restricted
to overhead reaching on a rare basis. As the Industrial Commission noted in its Order Denying
Reconsideration:
As we pointed out in our original decision, we believe the reliance on the results
of the SkillTRAN analysis is misplaced. Claimant has restrictions against
engaging in overhead reaching on a more than occasional basis. She has no
restrictions against other types of reaching that might be required in other types of
employment. However, because of the way data is collected by the US
Department of Labor, the SkillTRAN system is incapable of applying Claimant's
specific restriction to the data base of jobs: SkillTRAN only allows the evaluator
to screen out jobs that involve upper extremity reaching generally without the
ability to fine tune for a specific type of prohibited reaching.
Truthan Deposition 68/25-74-15.
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The commission went on:
Most of the jobs in the work place require upper extremity reaching of some type.
Withdrawing jobs that require some type of reaching from Claimant's labor
market results, results in a loss of up to 90% of the labor market. However, using
SkillTRAN in this fashion would remove from Claimant's labor market any
number of jobs (how many, we do not know) that she is actually capable of
performing per Mr. Bengston.
Order Denying Reconsideration, (R. p. 97).
The Claimant has not demonstrated that she is totally and permanently disabled pursuant
to the Odd-Lot Doctrine. The evidence in this case from both the functional capacity evaluation
and from Dr. Larson is that the Claimant is employable in sedentary and light employment on a
forty hour a week, full time basis. There is no medical evidence in the record from any source
that indicates that the Claimant cannot perform work at a sedentary or light level. As the ISIP
vocational expert, Dr. Nancy Collins testified over sixty percent of the jobs in the labor market
are sedentary and light positions. (Dr. Nancy Collins' Deposition, p. 39). Sedentary and light
jobs are available in both the Coeur d'Alene and Kellogg labor markets.
An employee may prove total disability under the Odd-Lot Doctrine in one of three ways:
1.

By showing that he has attempted other types of employment without success;

2.

By showing that he, or vocational counselors or employment agencies on his behalf,
have searched for other work and other work is not available; or

3.

By showing that any efforts to find suitable employment would be futile.

Hamilton v. Ted Beemus Logging & Construction, 127 Idaho 221 (1995).
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In the present case, the evidence is actually that the Claimant returned to employment
after the industrial accident as a child care worker and did so with success. The Claimant
qualified to perform child care work under the ICCP program run by the State of Idaho. This was
not an infonnal arrangement or a temporary arrangement between the Claimant and her daughter.
The ICCP program actually paid the Claimant a salary of approximately $1,200 per month.
(Hrg. Tr. p. 177). Moreover, the Claimant was required to provide child care on a forty hour per
week basis. The evidence is that the Claimant successfully performed that job, but that it was
terminated due to her daughter's incarceration. That is direct evidence that the Claimant is not
totally and permanently disabled, and as Dr. Collins noted, child care work is considered a
medium strength employment. (Dr. Nancy Collins' Deposition, p. 55). There is no reason the
Claimant cannot obtain a position in Kellogg as a child care worker.
The second method for demonstrating Odd-Lot disability is an actual search for work
either through vocational counselors and employment agencies, or directly, and not having work
available. There is no evidence in the record that the Industrial Commission Rehabilitation
Division or the Department of Employment searched for work for the Claimant. The testimony
concerning Claimant's employment search is vague. The Claimant, in two pre-hearing
depositions and her interrogatory responses, indicates that she had not yet applied for any jobs.
(Hrg. Tr. p. 177). The Claimant testified to only a few job contacts shortly before the hearing,
five years after the industrial accident.
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At the hearing, the Claimant testified that while she talked to people about jobs she did
not actually fill out any job applications. (Hrg. Tr., p. 173) When questioned on crossexamination at hearing she answered as follows:
Q.

Okay. So from 2007, when you left SVL, until late 2011, you didn't even
contact anybody, did you, for employment?

A.

No because I was working for ICCP.

(Hrg. Tr., p. 177).
The evidence in this case is that the Claimant made no attempt either directly, through the
ICRD office or through the Department of Employment to look for work from 2007 until late
2011. At the time of hearing, the Claimant was not seeking employment because she continued
to have custody of her three young grandchildren. (Hrg. Tr. p. 182).
The third method available for proving Odd-Lot disability is evidence that a work search
would be futile. Dr. Nancy Collins, who testified on behalf of the ISIP, testified that in her
opinion, a work search would not be futile in either the Kellogg or Coeur d'Alene labor markets
for the Claimant. The medical evidence in this case indicates that the Claimant can return to full
time employment on a sedentary or light basis. Moreover, the Claimant actually performed a
medium level job of child care successfully for ten months post accident. The testimony of Dan
Brownell concerning the Claimant's employability is not credible.
Despite the fact the Claimant worked ten months as a child care provider and that there
are numerous sedentary and light jobs available in both the Kellogg and Coeur d'Alene labor
markets, Mr. Brownell testified that it would be futile for the Claimant to look for work based on
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the results from the SkillTRAN analysis which overstated the Claimant's disability due to
inputting the wrong information on Claimant's reaching restrictions.
The Claimant in this case was forty-three years of age at the time of the industrial injury
in 2006. Almost six years later (at the time of the hearing) the Claimant was still a relatively
young woman at forty-nine years of age. While the Claimant cannot return to her position at
SVL Analytical, there are a significant number of jobs in her immediate labor market of Kellogg
and in Coeur d'Alene, approximately forty miles away, for her to perform.
V. ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD BE A WARDED TO THE ISIF

The ISIF is entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to I.AR. 11.2. The ISIF seeks an award of
attorneys fees. Under I.AR. 11.2 fees can be awarded if:
1. The other parties' arguments are not well grounded in fact, warranted by
existing law, or made in good faith,
2. The claims were brought for an improper purpose, such as unnecessary delay
or increase in the cost of litigation.
Frankv. Bunker Hill Co. 142 Idaho 126, 124 P.3d 1002 (2005).
In this case, the Claimant has essentially attempted to re-argue and re-try this case before

the Supreme Court. After a full Industrial Commission hearing and a decision by the Industrial
Commission supported by substantial and competent evidence including the testimony of two
medical doctors, the Idaho Industrial Commission determined the Claimant had no restrictions or
limitations referable to her 2006 industrial accident. Based on that substantial and competent
evidence, the Commission ruled that the Claimant was not entitled to any additional disability
over and above a 2% impairment.
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Without any evidence to support the position that the 2006 Industrial Injury worsened her
condition, other than the Claimant's own testimony, this Court is asked again to evaluate the
evidence and come to a conclusion different than the Industrial Commission did in both its
original decision and its Order Denying Reconsideration.
Moreover, the Claimant has continued in her assertion that she is totally and pennanently
disabled based in large measure upon the misapplication of the Skill TRAN computer program.
Claimant only has a restriction against overhead reaching, not reaching in all directions.
The Claimant has no restrictions against other types of reaching. Since the Skill TRAN program
only allows adjustment for reaching generally, it greatly overstates disability when used in this
manner.
The ovvner of the SkillTRAN company, Jeff Truthan, admitted in his deposition that his
software could not differentiate between restrictions for overhead reaching and reaching in
general. (Truthan Deposition, p. 74). Reluctantly, Mr. Truthan admitted that if you adjusted for
only occasional reaching as the Claimant's expert did you remove 90% of jobs that exist in the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles.

(Truthan Deposition, p. 70).

The SkillTRAN literature

actually warns against adjusting from frequent to occasional reaching because of a precipitous
drop in jobs. (Truthan Deposition, p. 73).
Despite clear testimony concerning the computer model's limitation from the O\VUer
himself and despite the Commission's rejection of the SkillTRAN analysis performed by Mr.
Brownell the Claimant continues to argue for a finding of total disability based on a flawed and
misleading computer model. The Claimant is again asking this Court to re-evaluate evidence
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and draw a different conclusion with regard to the vocational testimony when there is substantial
and competent evidence that the Claimant can return to sedentary and light work.
The award of attorney fees are appropriate where the Claimant persists in advancing this
flawed factual argument before the Idaho Supreme Court.

VI.

CONCLUSION

In summary, this is a straightforward case where the Claimant has failed to carry her burden
of proof to demonstrate that the industrial accident combined with her pre-existing impairment to
render her totally and pem1anently disabled. Dr. Larson, the Claimant's treating surgeon and the
person most directly involved in her treatment, testified that the falling incident of October 31, 2006
did not permanently damage the Claimant's cervical spine. The supplemental fusion surgery
performed by Dr. Larson returned the Claimant to the same condition she was in immediately prior
to the industrial accident. This was confirmed by Dr. Stevens who awarded the Claimant a 2%
upward adjustment based solely on the re-do fusion.
Furthermore, the Claimant cannot establish that she is totally and permanently disabled.
After her industrial accident and supplemental fusion, the Claimant successfully worked as a
child care provider for ten months. The Claimant has performed no significant work search, and
was not in the labor market at the time of the hearing because she had custody of her three young
grandchildren.
The court should affirm the Industrial Commission's decision that the Claimant failed to
establish total and permanent disability under the Odd-Lot Doctrine and failed to establish the
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necessary elements of ISIF liability. Moreover, Pursuant to LA.R. 11.2 attorney fees should be
awarded to the ISIF.
DATED this_!_~ day of August, 2014.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

THOMAS W. CALLERY
Attorney for Defendant ISIF

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the _ _ day of August, 2014, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile transmission to:
E-mail to:

Starr Kelso
PO Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

~

H. James Magnuson
PO Box 2288
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

0
0
0
0

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile transmission to:
E-mail to:

THOMAS W. CALLERY

RESPONDENT ISIF'S BRIEF

18

